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1. General aspects 
Decentralization is seen as an indispensable corollary of democracy, having for the organization of 
public administration the same weight as representative democracy has for constitutional organization. In 
fact, the issue of the relation between democracy and decentralization was quite often under the specialists’ 
scrutiny. The territorial citizens’ collectivities represent intermediary bodies, interposed between the 
individual and the central power, determining rules adapted to each geographic frame and personalizing 
state authority depending on the local problems. Modern society, characterized by contradictions and 
pluralism, implies a large variety of social behaviours and, therefore, making decisions at the central level 
is not sufficient, but their adaptation to the local specific is required. In the developing countries, the 
objectives of the decentralization process are, generally, focused on improving efficiency, equity, 
accessibility and quality of the services supplied, as well as of the degree to which they cover the local 
needs. In fact, decentralization is very clearly linked both to economic development, and to the democratic 
governing systems1. 
Through decentralization one aims to improve the performance of a certain service by changing the 
authority and responsibility between key-actors, the improvement of the informational flow for grounding 
decisions and assessing performance, the establishing of accountability mechanisms and of motivation 
modalities for all actors, to be responsible in fulfilling their duties.  
2. Conditions of decentralization 
Decentralization represents an administrative organization system that allows human collectivities or public 
services to self-administer, under the control of the state, which grants them legal personality, allows the 
establishing of their own authorities and endows them with the necessary resources.2 At present, there is a 
global tendency towards re-examining the role of the different levels of governance existing in a country, 
for the purpose of transferring as many competences and resources to those levels that are closer to the 
citizen, to involve more consistently the private sector and civil society in the public decision-making 
process3.  
This tendency, which was felt in the last decade both in the developed and in the developing countries, 
manifests as a combination of political, administrative, and fiscal reforms. Political decentralization 
(devolution) – the only real one, as the analysts consider – presupposes the transfer of tasks and afferent 
decisional powers to local levels of government and the implicit limitation of the central intervention 
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capacity. Thus, decentralization constitutes an important change in the plan of the formal institutions in a 
state. Fiscal decentralization presupposes the creation of mechanisms for the transfer of the financial 
resources at the local level. Many times, it goes in parallel with political decentralization, but not always. 
To try to measure the political decentralization degree solely through the percentage of public resources 
spent at the local level is deceiving, because, many times, the local administrations simply receive 
instructions to execute from the center, namely, precise tasks, sometimes accompanied by resources with 
this well-defined destination, but this does not mean at all that their decisional power increased t.  
Finally, there is a third aspect, called deconcentration: the transfer of tasks from the central institutions to 
organs subordinated to them, physically located outside the capital (for example, territorial directions and 
inspectorates of ministries, prefects’ offices etc). Strictly speaking, deconcentration is not decentralization, 
because it refers only to a reassignment of functions within the central state administration, without 
affecting the local levels of governance, which are not subordinated to it. However, in practice, it indirectly 
affects local communities because decentralization and deconcentration most often go hand in hand, being 
even able to have a common legislative ground4.  
The justification of this global tendency to bring political decision and the supply of public services “closer 
to the citizen”, according to the principle of subsidiarity, is that in this way, politics will translate more 
faithfully into public action the real needs of the communities, and the services will be more efficiently 
supplied. In addition, many times, decentralization is promoted by its adepts also for the reason that it 
would reduce corruption in administration, especially due to bringing the decisional act closer to the 
directly affected community. 
But what was taken for a long time as postulate proved to be less clear when putting into practice. 
Decentralization (promoted in parallel with a certain amount of administrative deconcentration of the 
central government) proved that it can sometimes settle local decision issues, has eased the access to the 
information of local nature, has made certain services more efficient and has made the citizens feel 
politically better represented. However, other times, it was proven itself a source of new problems: the 
increase of the differences between the rich and poor communities, slow coordination, fiscal indiscipline5. 
But, especially, since through decentralization the centers of political decision multiply exponentially, it 
has raised concerns related to the possibility of aggravating corruption by the capturing of the public 
institutions by the local elites. 
In fact, the impact on the level of corruption is one of the most interesting aspects of the decentralization 
process, still insufficiently researched. The promoters of decentralization usually place the limiting of 
corruption among the benefits to be expected, this being for them an argument in favour of speeding up the 
process. Many times it is believed that the simple transfer of tasks and resources from the center to the 
other levels of government will settle the issue. But reality has proven more complicated – many times, 
decentralization seems to be accompanied by an increase of the cases of corruption, at least as indicated by 
anecdotic depositions, as well as by an increase of the public concern towards this phenomenon. Some 
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recent comparative studies even reached the conclusion that, in total, more decentralization means, in fact, 
more corruption6. 
3. Decentralization and corruption 
There are many studies that argue that the promise of decentralization to bring more responsibility and 
transparency to the political process is difficult to fulfill. If the local officials come more often in contact 
with the citizens, this does not necessarily mean that they will better represent their interests, as usually 
argued. On the contrary: in particularistic environments, or where a defective public decision-making 
process is predominant, in fact, the personalization of interaction is even more encouraged, and the 
professionalism and neutrality of the public services can be reduced7. The personalization of these relations 
thus constitutes a good terrain for corruption, since the officials end up being more careful to the individual 
redistribution needs of narrow territorial coalitions, than to the general public interest. Prud’homme8 lists 
several reasons why this is happening: 
• the influence of the local groups of interests increases, while in particularistic societies, these 
groups control to a large extent the local public life; the higher degree of influence on the political life by 
the local elite in traditional communities, including the vote attendance and the results of the vote, support 
this idea; 
• empirically it is noticed the fact that the local elected tend to have, in general, longer terms, being 
re-elected more often, when the decentralization degree is higher; 
• the pot of the local political game is higher when the control of the resources is decentralized; 
• the possibility to control through media disclosures and moral pressure from the public decreases, 
because the political actors are now much more numerous, and the public’s attention is a limited resource; 
• the possibility to monitor of the central independent agencies decreases. This last point is not a 
trivial one at all: an analysis on a grant program for local communities destined for road building, assigned 
by the Indonesian government to the local authorities, indicates that the audit of the central institutions – 
even only the previously notified possibility of a full audit – discourage fund embezzlement more than the 
involvement mechanisms of the local community can do with respect to monitoring the use of the funds, 
whish is a central concept of participative democracy, often encouraged by the international assistance 
institutions9. Treisman (1999) supports the above conclusions: he performs a statistical analysis on 85 
states, from which derives the fact that federal states are perceived as being more corrupt than the average. 
This happens because, generally:  
• they are larger;  
• they tend to have authorities for the control and application of the law placed on several layers, 
both centrally and locally, hence easier to subject to “asymmetric pressures”; in addition, the jurisdictions 
overlapping in applying the law create a motivation for “excessive feeding” in extracting undue benefits; 
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• they tend to have an upper parliament chamber with veto powers over decisions, which is elected 
on regional basis (which increases the probability that the local politicians will develop special relations 
with these representatives of theirs at the center). 
Political decentralization seems to be a factor of corruption in the economic reform process in Russia, but 
not in China10. The authors comparatively analyze the role of local authorities in the two cases and reach 
the conclusion that, in China, it was a beneficial role in the industrial restructuring process, while in Russia 
it was a generally negative one. Over-taxation, plus abusive and uncoordinated regulations introduced out 
of local initiative would be at least partly responsible for the degradation of the economic environment and 
the proliferation of corruption in the second case. The difference between the two situations is, therefore, 
identified by the authors in the political component of decentralization, present in Russia, but absent in 
China. 
There are numerous other such demonstrations, but given the complexity of the phenomena, weak points 
can easily be found. For instance, the conclusions of Treisman’s statistical analysis can be overturned by 
including dummy variables, such as some of the ones he reports as explanatory factors: the size of the state, 
respectively (as population); or the existence of local police forces separate from the central one. If these 
two variables are taken out of the definition of federalism, then the correlation between it and corruption 
disappears11. Also, the analysis on the cases of China and Russia ignores the fundamentally different role 
institutions with similar names play in the two countries, which have political regimes difficult to compare. 
In China, many trading companies are in the legal ownership of the local authority, being used including as 
suppliers of social services (kindergartens, schools, households). This way, they are, in fact, extensions of 
the local administration. The relation is completely different between the two actors in Russia, where the 
local and the regional administration have separated from the economic activities, the companies do not 
fulfill social functions, and the public authority has the interest to exploit the commercial agents in any 
way. Contradicting Treisman, other statistical comparative studies identify a negative correlation between 
the level of decentralization of a country and the perceived level of corruption. Fisman and Gatti12 measure 
decentralization through the percentage of public resources spent by means of the locale budgets (fiscal 
decentralization), and for corruption use three sets of data, all results of perception surveys. The authors say 
that their results show that the decentralization of public expenses significantly correlates with a lower level 
of perceived corruption, even in the conditions when the influence of other factors, such as those mentioned 
by Treisman, is controlled. Huther and Shah13 (1998) have also performed a transnational statistical study 
and their conclusions converge with Fisman’s and Gatti’s: fiscal decentralization seems to be associated 
with a better governance, understood as citizens’ political participation, transparency of the public 
institutions, social equity and a lower level of corruption perceived by the public. The assignment of 
resources tends to be better in the long term, especially in developing countries, where centralization was 
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especially disadvantageous for the financing of the social sectors, such as education and health (where 
corruption, although present, usually takes more benign forms). Case studies that go deeper seem to 
confirm this: Wade (1997) shows that the sector of irrigations, one of the most centralized in India, is also 
one with a very corrupt bureaucracy, and the maintaining of the central control achieves nothing than the 
poor assignment of resources, the strengthening of the beneficiaries’ cynicism and, finally corruption14. 
So, there are at least as many counter-examples to the cases mentioned in which the transfer of the decision 
and resources at the local level actually increases transparency and makes the political system more 
accountable towards the citizen. Political competition encourages innovation and transfer of good practices, 
and, at least in some fields (although not in all), the citizens are truly better informed with respect to the 
public matters of local interest. Hence, it is possible that what seems at first as a proliferation of corruption 
generated by decentralization to be only an increase of the public’s interest and the general familiarization 
degree with the political mechanism. 
Crook and Manor (2000)15 studied the situation closely in India, Bangladesh and Ghana an reached the 
conclusion that the localization of the decision has lead to the increase of concern regarding public matters, 
which also increased the frequency of reporting acts of corruption, hence distorted the perception 
measurements made through opinion surveys. In fact, the authors indicate that the total of resources 
controlled through obscure means by a small number of persons with influence in the administration has 
decreased, only that before decentralization, these persons were not very visible at the local level. 
It is true that decentralization increase the number of decisional centers and makes direct monitoring more 
difficult. However, on the other hand, it diminishes the benefits associated to the act of corruption, by 
reducing the number of persons involved in a certain decision, which reduces the number of “thresholds” 
that must be overcome through dishonest means. Analyzing all these factors, Wildasin (1995)16 concludes 
that the local officials who have well established duties are less likely to engage in acts of grand corruption, 
unlike the large, nontransparent central bureaucracy. He even launches the idea that decentralization in 
general reduces the level of corruption, unlike deconcentration, which can increase it. 
In short, there is a long list of factors that might act on the relation between corruption and decentralization, 
in both directions. On the one hand, decentralization may lead to a reduction of corruption because:  
• the locally elected know better than the central ones the real needs of the community, hence, it is 
less probable for them to act simply as mandatories for duties indicated from the center, whose utility they 
doubt (fertile ground for cynicisms and corruption); 
• inversely, in certain conditions, citizens know more about the decision-making process and they 
get more involved; 
• competition occurs between the local administrations: through the quality of the package of taxes 
and services supplied (in principle, the citizens being thus able to move in order to opt for the package they 
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agree with the most); through the imagine of local governance more or less clean, moral pressure is created 
for the most corrupt administrations to act in order to remedy the situation; 
• promoted in judicious combination with deconcentration (but, most often, to the detriment of the 
latter), decentralization many lead to the limitation of the action power of the bureaucratic extensions of the 
central government in the territory – usually, the most opaque and non-responsive part of the central 
administration.  
On the other hand, decentralization may lead to the proliferation of corruption because: 
• where the cost of information and civic participation are high, and tradition in this sense is weak, 
the citizens may know more of what is happening at the center than at the local level; the few existing civic 
competences focus in this direction;  
• the increase of the decisional centers, correlated with the inexistence or weakness of the horizontal 
control mechanisms between the public institutions (horizontal accountability), may encourage 
discretionary behaviour and the breaching of the law by the local political elites; 
• where there are several levels of intermediary governance between the center and the local 
communities (regions, districts etc.) an adequate balance of power is difficult to achieve between all 
administrative levels of the state, such as the intermediary ones to not abusively exercise the newly 
obtained powers to the detriment of the local administration at the basis (the actual local authority); 
• where a chamber of the national parliament is elected on explicitly territorial principles (to 
represent regions, districts etc.), and these circumscriptions coincide with strong intermediary levels of 
governance, there are high chances that obscure interest coalitions form between the regional leaders and 
the central representatives. 
The fundamental issue posed by “adequate” decentralization (devolution) in the political plane is, therefore, 
that a level of governance too close to the citizen may be more easily confiscated by illegitimate influences. 
More than two centuries ago, James Madison clearly expressed this idea17: 
The smaller a society is, the fewer will probably be the distinct factions and groups of interests that make it 
up; the fewer these groups are, the more frequent a majority of the same faction will be found; and the 
smaller the number of individuals making up a majority, the easier it will be for them to coordinate in 
order to put into application their oppression plans. Enlarge the sphere and include a higher diversity of 
factions and interest groups; in this way, you make it less probable that a majority unites around a common 
cause and breaches the rights of other citizens; or, if such a cause exists, it will be more difficult for those 
joining it to discover their own strength and to act together. (Federalist Papers, no. 10). 
In continuing these observations of Madison, recent studies show how, for instance, decentralization of the 
decision to the local authorities in India has strengthened the traditional power structure of an insufficiently 
modernized society (Bardhan and Mockerjee, 2002)18. Thus, the local elites obtained a formal instrument 
through which they institutionalized their until then informal domination over the community, gaining, in 
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addition, supplementary resources they can control in order to strengthen patronage and social control 
networks. These unwanted evolutions at the local level must, however, be put in balance with the other 
tendency, just as damaging, of the central bureaucracy, to create obscure assignment mechanisms by means 
of which considerable public resources are misappropriate for the benefit of several well-connected groups 
or individuals. Probably the worst thing that can happen, in fact, in a society, is for the two tendencies to 
potentate – and not cancel – each other. And the interesting thing to know in this case is when and why this 
is happening. Bardhan and Mockerjee are concerned especially with the complex movement of these 
contradicting tendencies in particular circumstances (different states in India). Not at all surprising, the 
connection they find between decentralization and corruption is an ambiguous one. 
The idea must not surprise. In order for the potential benefits of decentralization to be achieved in practice, 
a reasonable level of transparency and accountability is necessary from the locally elected, together with a 
reasonable level of interest and competence of the citizens. Civic involvement, even at a minimal level, 
presupposes the payment of certain costs of information and coordination of the public action. According to 
Putnam, certain institutional arrangements are better than others, because they reduce these costs. The state-
towns in northern Italy, unlike the communities in the south, have developed in the 11th and 12th centuries, 
promotion mechanisms of a strong civic accountability which proved winning in the long term, which 
explains the differences in the quality of the governance perpetuated until today. 
In general, it is a matter of establishing contractual-type of relations between the leaders and the citizens, 
the relatively free and equal access to the public information and decision and the transparency in using 
common resources. 
4. Decentralization and corruption in Romania19 
The decentralization process represents a direct effect of globalisation in the public sector. Several 
specialised papers and studies have already approached the connection between decentralization and 
corruption. Without ignoring Rose-Ackerman’s contributions and other outstanding contributions, the core 
ideas of our brief analysis take into consideration a recent study presented in The Policy Research Working 
Paper Series, by Anwar Shah (2006) [24]. For Romania, Andrei, T. (2007) achieved a relevant study [25]. 
In Romania, public administration reform in the area of decentralization and devolution includes three 
major elements: continuing decentralization by transfer of competences and administrative and financial 
responsibilities from central to local public administration authorities; continuing the devolution process by 
delegation of responsibilities in the territory, depending on the needs on local level, within the same 
administrative structure (the devolved services are subordinated to the ministry that delegated the 
responsibility); transforming the devolved services in territory, depending on citizens’ needs into 
decentralised services under local authorities’ responsibility. It is unanimously recognised the fact that the 
decentralization process and corruption could determine significant negative effects on economic and social 
level, on medium and long term. 
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Andrei, T. (2007) achieves a study aimed to determine some characteristics of corruption in local public 
administration. The research was achieved on a representative sample of mayors of Romanian localities 
during November – December 2005. 
In order to create the sample, a cluster-type technique was used, the volume of the sample representing 9% 
from the total population of mayors. All mayors from seven counties were interviewed, the counties were 
randomly extracted. The error for estimating the parameters at the reference population level is plus/minus 
1.2%. 
The questionnaire comprised questions on measuring the mayors’ opinion about actual issues concerning   
public administration reform, namely: civil service management, civil servants’ in-service training, local 
public administration reform by continuing the decentralization process, ensuring the training of elected 
officials on topics specific for local public administration, corruption, changes in the technical body from 
administration under the pressure of the political factor, quality of communication in the reform process 
etc. We shall use the database from the prospect of analysing the characteristics of corruption phenomenon 
in local public administration and identifying some characteristics of the decentralization process. A 
logistic model will be defined for corruption analysis. The analysis on the database aims to identify the 
mayors’ position related to corruption in local public administration, thus estimating the amplitude and 
causes. 
Within the framework of the study, based on the data recorded for the sample, the corruption phenomenon 
is signalled especially by the mayors that consider citizens to be directly involved in relevant decision-
making on community level. Thus, Pearson correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.315, 
significant for a threshold of 1%. This characteristic emphasises a direct cause for occurrence and 
maintaining of corruption phenomenon, namely lack of transparency in decision-making in public 
institutions from local public administration. 
In the context of decentralization, the study states: ”corruption together with other factors contributes 
directly to low quality for service provision by a local public administration. The study defines the derivate 
variable: “Extent in which local public administration achieves its core functions” (Q5), as average of four 
variables, defining core functions: a) administrating and managing the public goods and funds at local level 
(Q1); b) ensuring basic services on local level (health, social security, education, culture, military etc.) 
(Q2); c) prognosis and economic-social development (Q3); and d) organisation (Q4). In order to quantify 
the mayors’ opinion related to the extent in which local public administration achieves its core functions, a 
scale of ordinal measure was defined with the following items: 1- very low extent, 2- low extent, 3 – great 
extent, 4- very great extent. Table 4 presents the characteristics of the four primary variables and derivate 
variable.   
In the current study about decentralization, the mayors’ vision is that local public administrations can fulfil 
their core functions only on a low extent; the less favourable situation is the low capacity of prognosis and 
economic-social development at local level, and ensuring basic public services. The low capacity of local 
administrations in basic service provision is determined directly by inadequate administration and 
management of public goods and funds on local level (Pearson coefficient is 0.549) and low organisational 
capacity (0.563). 
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